"Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification by Moretti, Luca
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification 
 
Luca Moretti 
University of Aberdeen 
l.moretti@abdn.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
1. Introduction
In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central 
theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumptions of my research, specify the intended audience 
of this book and summarize its structure.
This work aims to introduce, dissect and evaluate the important but controversial 
epistemological position called phenomenal conservatism. Variants or special versions of this 
position have been lingering in the views of various philosophers for the last forty years, until 
Michael Huemer (2001) introduced phenomenal conservatism officially into epistemology, using 
this name.1 Ever since, the popularity of this position has constantly increased.
Phenomenal conservatism maintains that our appearances or seemings –– the ways things 
appear to us to be –– have the inherent power to justify our beliefs. According to the phenomenal 
conservative, for example, if it appears to you, say, that it is raining outside, that 15 - 7 = 8, or that 
Hitler was a wicked man, you thereby have a good reason to believe these things. This reason or 
justification is nevertheless defeasible –– it can be destroyed by further evidence indicating that the 
appearance is unreliable or the belief false. Appearances are conceived of by the phenomenal 
conservative as experiences –– so, not as beliefs or other doxastic states –– provided with 
propositional content.
Phenomenal conservatism looks very natural and comes with a number of apparent 
epistemological benefits. For instance, it supplies a clear account of where our justification –– 
perhaps all our epistemic justification –– basically comes from: it originates from our seemings. It 
also illuminates the rationality of ordinary epistemic practices in which we take ourselves or others 
to have reasons to entertain beliefs just because of how things appear to be. Phenomenal 
1 James Pryor (2000, 2004) has simultaneously introduced a very similar view, though less general, called dogmatism.
2conservatism also shields us from sceptical threats, for we don’t need antecedent guarantee that our 
appearances are reliable to get justification from them.
As other interesting philosophical views, phenomenal conservatism has been praised for its 
merits but also targeted with various objections. My research aims to show that phenomenal 
conservatives can dismiss some of the most worrisome challenges raised against their view. In 
particular, I will argue that if seemings were penetrated (i.e. partly caused) by other cognitive states 
of the subject, they would not lose their inherent justifying power. So, against the claims of certain 
epistemologists, the possibility of cognitively penetrated appearances is not a threat to phenomenal 
conservatism. Furthermore, I will show that it hasn’t actually been proven that phenomenal 
conservatism clashes with Bayesian methodology. Hence, in spite of what various philosophers 
think, phenomenal conservatism isn’t objectionable in this sense. I will also show that phenomenal 
conservatism doesn’t sanction suspicious procedures that appear to produce justification in an 
excessively easy way. Thus, in contrast to an apparently forceful and recurring criticism, 
phenomenal conservatism isn’t problematic in this sense either.
I will nevertheless contend that phenomenal conservatism has an important limit: seeming-
based justification is elusive: it fades away when the subject becomes reflectively aware of the 
relevant seeming. I will describe some ways in which this fact limits the actual explanatory role of 
phenomenal conservatism and its antisceptical bite.
Phenomenal conservatism could virtually be connected to indefinitely many issues and 
debates in philosophy. In this short monograph I have selected only some of the issues discussed in 
current literature, and I have introduced some novel questions. In the final part of the book, I 
suggest further areas of investigation that scholars interested in phenomenal conservatism might 
want to explore.
3As other philosophical investigations, my work rests on some assumptions. One of the most 
crucial is this:2 I assume that justification is an internalist notion. In other words, I assume that 
when a subject S has justification for entertaining some propositional attitude, what produces this 
justification is a factor reflectively accessible to S, or a mental state of S.3 There may be various 
reasons to endorse internalism about justification. My view is that the new evil demon argument 
(Lehrer and Cohen 1983 and Cohen 1984) gives it a strong support.4 
Although I will generally introduce and clarify the philosophical notions that I use in my 
analyses and arguments, the discussion carried out in the next chapters will typically be rather  
“technical” and so quite advanced. Accordingly, this book is suitable for an audience of 
postgraduate students and scholars of analytic philosophy who have already a background in 
epistemology and want to be introduced to phenomenal conservatism and/or intend to go deeper 
into some of its more or less problematic features and implications.
This is the structure of the book. In §2 I present phenomenal conservatism and the notion of 
seeming or appearance. I also review asserted epistemic merits of phenomenal conservatism and 
some preliminary difficulties of it. In §3 I discuss the conjecture that appearances are cognitively 
penetrable and evaluate and reject a number of objections to phenomenal conservatism hinging on 
this conjecture. In §4 I criticize and reject a celebrated argument to the effect that phenomenal 
conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism. I also contend that seeming-based justification is 
elusive in the way described before. In §5 I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, 
the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is limited but phenomenal conservatism isn’t 
actually affected by easy justification problems. In § 6, I draw the conclusions of my work.
2 These are other assumptions of my research: I work with an invariantist, non-relativist and non-pragmatically 
encroached notion of epistemic justification (although these assumptions might ultimately not be necessary to the 
soundness of my arguments). 
3 Although I’m very sympathetic to accessibilism, I prefer to leave open the possibility that internalism could find its 
best characterization when interpreted as mentalism. (For a characterization of accessibilism and mentalism see §2.)   
4 Littlejohn (forthcoming) and Williamson (forthcoming) have challenged this argument. See however Madison 
(2017)’s rejoinder. 
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